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Moderators:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. TALBOTT: Good morning, everybody. I'm Strobe Talbott, and it is my great honor to welcome all of you here today. And that means those of us who are gathered here in this rather small city on the Potomac River, and also those who are gathered there, in that great city -- in every sense of the word "great" -- on the Bosporus.

I want to also welcome you to the celebration of a tradition. In Turkey, with its ancient history and culture, for an event to become a tradition requires several centuries, at least -- or maybe even a millennia. In this rather young nation, a decade is enough.

This is the 10th annual Sakıp Sabancı lecture. That makes it appropriate -- and it makes all of us very grateful -- that our speaker today was the inaugural Sabancı lecturer in 2005, my friend, Brookings's friend, the world's friend, and Güler's friend, Madeleine Albright.

Please join me in thanking her for being here with us today.

Secretary Albright delivered that first Sabancı lecture in the wake of more bad news than good news, particularly related both to the policy and aspirations of Turkey and of the United States.

Back then, al Qaeda of Mesopotamia had been on a brutal rampage in Iraq. The abhorrent evidence of American use of torture at Abu Ghraib had come to light. Terrorists had struck in Spain, killing nearly 200 people. Chechen suicide bombers in Russia had blown up two planes on takeoff from an airport outside of Moscow. And the siege of a school in Beslan had triggered a massacre that killed more than 300 children and teachers.

I call attention to those last two events because Russia is and always will be an important neighbor of Turkey, and those tragedies I just referred to may have some resonance with the topic that I suspect will come up in the discussion today -- mainly,

what's happening in Russia and around its periphery.

As for the evolution of an integrated Europe, back when Madeleine spoke to us before, there had been some good news in that the E.U. expanded by admitting 10 new members. But that was offset by very bad news: the collapse in 2004 of the Annan Plan, which was a crucial, consequential, and lamentable setback for Turkey's accession -- a goal that our lecturer, our friend, our guest of honor has championed throughout her career as a national and global leader.

So, with that particularly in mind, Madame Secretary, on behalf of all of us, we're most grateful for your willingness to help us look back -- and, perhaps more important, to look forward.

We are joined, as always, by an audience at Sabancı University, via -- and here is where, every year, I offer a one-word prayer, inshallah -- a technologically perfect video link.

Professor Emre Hatipoğlu will be our moderator in Istanbul. TÜSİAD's Senior Fellow, Kemal Kirişci of Brookings, will be our moderator on this end, for a gathering that is, as always, in honor of Sakıp Sabancı and his legacy. He was a shrewd entrepreneur, a champion of Turkey's democratic and economic reforms, and a philanthropist.

I've already mentioned Güler Sabancı. As virtually everyone here knows -- and, of course, in Istanbul knows particularly well -- she is Sakıp Bey's niece and the Chair of the Sabancı University Board of Trustees.

We're also pleased to have her colleague, Professor Fuat Keyman, from the Istanbul Policy Center at Sabancı University, together with several members of the Turkish press.

And speaking of the media, as long as your mobiles are off, you're invited to do something that was neither possible or plausible -- and certainly not polite --

10 years ago, which is to tweet. And you can tweet using #Sabancı2014.

It's my pleasure now to turn the program and the lectern over to one of the two great ladies and leaders we have with us today, Güler.

MS. SABANCI: Yes, distinguished guests, it's great to be in Washington again. And it's good morning here, and good afternoon in Istanbul.

Today's Sabancı University guests are in the Sakıp Sabancı Museum. So, we are connected to the European side of Istanbul, for those of you to visualize where we are connected.

Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Ambassador of Turkey, Strobe Talbott, and, of course, the members of the Sakıp Sabancı family -- his daughters are with us in Istanbul. I can see them from the screen -- President of Sabancı University, Nihat Berker. Today, as Strobe Talbott has said, it is the 10th anniversary of our Sakıp Sabancı conference series. It's organized with the collaboration of Brookings Institution and the Istanbul Policy Center at Sabancı University, under the name and for the memory of Sakıp Sabancı, which most of you know now.

As Strobe has said, he was a legendary entrepreneur, and he was the honorary chairman of Sabancı University -- Founding Chairman, I could say, of the Sabancı University.

He was a strong believer, I must say, of coloration, participation, partnering, and lasting relationships. Sabancı Group is well-known for his being a reliable partner, and I'm very pleased and honored to see that this heritage has been put forward with the relationship together with Brookings Institution and the Sabancı University.

First of all, I would like to thank, again, Strobe Talbott, my friend, for opening the doors of Brookings Institution to Sabancı University. I have many thanks to those who have all contributed -- until now -- to the Sakıp Sabancı lectures from the

Istanbul Policy Center and, of course, my dear friend, Kemal Derviş, and Professor Kemal Kirişci, from the Brookings side.

But it has started 10 years ago, I remember, with the collaboration between Ahmet Evin and Phil Gordon those years. So, we come all the way.

And I'm, of course, grateful, also, today, again, for Ambassador of Turkish Embassy represented here today again. They have always been with us, during this decade.

I have, of course, a special, special thanks and gratitude to Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, which I feel privileged to call my friend. We are honored that she's again with us. She had honored us 10 years ago by delivering the very first lecture of this conference series, "America, Turkey, and the World."

And today, I'm sure we will hear her again, after a decade, the changes and the challenges of the world we are living in, in this triangle basis.

Of course, she has set the stage, the tone, and raised the bar of these lectures 10 years ago. And during these 10 years, we have had the privilege -- we were enlightened with a lot of interesting and notable luminaries -- namely, speakers like Brzezinski, Javier Solana, Kaushik Basu, Phillip Hill Gordon, Lord Chris Patton, Nicholas Burns, and late Richard Holbrooke and Paul Wolfowitz.

As the theme suggests, global challenges have multiplied over the last decade, and so have the opportunities, we like to think. We are still feeling the aftershocks of the 2008 financial crisis and the Arab Spring. The recent developments in Eastern Europe, between Russia and Ukraine, are sure to have much wider implications, as well.

We have had to rethink the concept of security, stability, cooperation, and development in light of emerging global challenges, like climate change, water, food, and energy shortages.

During such challenging times, Turkey's growth has been exemplary in the last decade. Its continuous economic growth has also provided a necessary boost for domestic political stability.

As we speak, Turkey's preparing to take over the G20 leadership from Australia. More importantly, despite all of the recent domestic and international impediments, Turkey is resolved and on the path to Europe. We are striving on the path of Europe. Turkey still sees Europe as (inaudible) to stimulate its domestic reforms process and development.

The massive global challenges we face today are also opportunities for emerging powers like Turkey to claim stake in global governance. The time is now for these countries to step up to the challenge and become reliable partners of international order.

As Winston Churchill once said, "The empires of the future are empires of the mind. The pursuit of knowledge will define the next phase of human development," and I'm delighted that we contribute to that ethos with our conference series.

I am also extremely honored to see the Sakıp Sabancı conference series come full circle with Secretary Albright's address today.

I wish you all a stimulating and fruitful conference.

Thank you.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Güler, thank you very much for all that you said, and for your friendship. I really treasure it, and the fact that we have gotten to know each other so well over the past 10 years -- and the wonderful job that you are doing in carrying forward your uncle's commitment to transatlantic cooperation and understanding. And so it's a great pleasure, personally and professionally, to have a chance to be here with you.

I'd like to greet the students. Watching them is interesting. I am a

professor, so I like it when they're really looking at you.

I also would like to thank my very good friend, Strobe, for your leadership at Brookings and beyond. And you were the best of partners when we worked together at the State Department. And I say this fully: You are the best of thinkers and policy advisers, and a true, true friend. So, thank you very much, Strobe.

And I thank everybody for being here, and I'd like to wish you all a very happy May Day.

10 years ago, I had the honor of delivering the very first Sabancı lecture -- or, as I said at the time, being present at the creation. In an age of short attention spans, where new ideas fall in and out of fashion as fast as you can say "MySpace," I'm so pleased to see the way this lecture series has taken root. And as you list all the previous speakers, I'm deeply honored to be on the other end of this again.

I have to confess that Turkey is one of my favorite countries in the world, for its beauty, its history, and its culture. As my granddaughter, Ellie, enthusiastically observed when I took her there for a visit when she was a third-grader -- she said, "Now I understand why Turkey is so special." We spent the night in Europe, and had lunch in Asia. She summarized it so well.

I'm proud to acknowledge that I've been viewed as Turkophile for many years, going back to the Carter administration, when we lifted the arms embargo on Turkey.

And one of my most memorable trips was in September 1999, after the earthquakes hit Izmir. The devastation was mind-boggling, but so was the people's resolve to rebuild.

And later that fall, I returned with President Clinton as he addressed the Grand National Assembly, and I quote: "To express America's solidarity with the Turkish people, and to reaffirm our partnership for a common future."

During my years in government, our leaders worked together to end the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo, and that led to an effort to bring more countries into a Europe whole, democratic, and united, from the Adriatic to the Baltic and beyond, including Turkey.

Today, that idea is under assault in Ukraine. Our countries again share values and strong interest in the fate of 200,000 Crimean Tatars, who suddenly find themselves involuntarily in Russia.

I want to pause for a moment to address Ukraine. Vice President Biden gave an impassioned and important speech at the Atlantic Council yesterday. He emphasized that our goal is for the people of Ukraine, as a single country, to have a real choice about how they want their country to proceed. This will require the United States and our partners to support Ukraine, and help shape a vision of how a united Ukraine can have a sustainable relationship with the West.

And that vision is currently in development, and it will affect not only this region, but the entire post-Cold War international order.

It's important to confront a big lie that I hear around town. Some say that Russia is acting in Ukraine because the U.S. was not accommodating enough to Russian concerns in the 1990s. That assertion wasn't right then, and it's certainly wrong about what is happening today.

President Putin has declared that the breakup of the Soviet Union is the greatest tragedy of the 20th century. But the truth is that the Soviet system fell apart because it didn't work, and countries simply did not want to be a part of it. Today, Putin has developed his own narrative. He envisions a Russian empire, buffered by states that are either weak or subservient.

The decision we now face is whether we believe that Putin's vision is acceptable, and whether we think it ends in Eastern Ukraine. I'm happy to touch on this

more in the question-and-answer portion, but what I really want to do now is come to do what I've planned to do, which is to turn back to Turkey.

It's a country I've travelled to many times, for a variety of occasions. And last year, I spoke at an event in New York commemorating the 150th anniversary of Robert College in Istanbul, a milestone that reinforced, yet again, the enduring friendship between Turkey and the United States. So, I feel a sense of personal history in standing here today. And I want to bring that spirit of perspective to my remarks. After all, 10 years doesn't seem so long ago, but think of all that has happened since then.

We've had a global financial meltdown, a European crisis of confidence, an Arab awakening, an American energy bonanza, a U.S. pivot to Asia, a civil war in Syria that has threatened stability across the Middle East, and, now, Russia's aggression.

And, of course, we've also witnessed a transformation in Turkey itself. To paraphrase the Council on Foreign Relations Taskforce report that I led a couple of years ago with Steve Hadley, "Turkey's political, economic, and social reforms, and more active, ambitious foreign policy have rendered the country virtually unrecognizable to longtime Turkey watchers."

For all our cooperation, the reality is that our relationship with Turkey has always been complex. For decades, many in Turkey held negative views of the United States, and our collaboration often featured robust debate, and, sometimes, we did not agree.

When I stood here a decade ago, the mood was hardly tranquil. Critics in Washington were angered by Ankara's refusal to led the Iraq invasion be launched from Turkish soil, while in Turkey, a survey found that 4 in 10 Turkish citizens considered America their greatest enemy.

Since then, our countries have cooperated on the elimination of nuclear weapons and on regional security issues. And we disagreed sometimes, as the

landscape of Turkey's neighborhood has changed profoundly, in ways that few of us properly anticipated, and that has made almost everything more complex, more volatile, and more challenging. But we're still here, and our alliance still holds, and we still share key values and goals.

Our job, as we work through this dynamic period, is to keep our eyes on the horizon, encouraging Turkey's continued participation on the global stage, deepening collaboration wherever we can, in a spirit of mutual respect, and supporting the principles of liberty and democracy that underpin peace and prosperity.

The agenda our countries share is diverse, touching on most issues in today's headlines, and I hope that we'll get to many of them in this question-and-answer period. But in my prepared remarks, what I wanted to do was to focus on two strategic issues at the heart of our countries' relationship and ability to work together. And those are energy and democracy.

So, why these two issues? Because energy security is, and will continue to be, a vital part of Turkey's influence and role in the region. And the strengthening of Turkey's democratic institutions will prove crucial in shaping how Turkey conducts itself, both at home and abroad.

On energy, Turkey remains a net importer, with 75 percent of its total energy demand coming from external sources. But as everyone from Constantine to Conoco-Phillips has recognized, Turkey's geostrategic location is second-to-none. It's a country situated not just at the crossroads of continents, but at the crossroads of hydrocarbons.

I'm sure that many of you, like me, have sat mesmerized on the banks of the Bosporus, by watching the maneuvers of huge oil tankers and smaller vessels navigating that difficult strait, while also contemplating all the history that has taken place on that water.

In order to feed global demand, nearly 3 million barrels pass through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles every single day. But this is small compared to what could come online in the next few years.

Turkey makes up only half a percent of the world's landmass, but, astonishingly, it is located near more than 70 percent of the world's proven oil and gas reserves. To the east, lie Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and, eventually, Turkmenistan, with billions of barrels of oil and gas. Russia pumps natural gas under the Black Sea, via the Blue Stream pipeline. To the west, very promising gas fields are spread under the Eastern Mediterranean. And all of these resources may find that the best and quickest route to voracious European markets is through Turkey.

The old maxim of realtors everywhere holds true for geopolitics, as well: It's all about location, location, location. And given Turkey's prime real estate at the crossroads of east and west, it's perfectly positioned to be the length between suppliers and customers, as it has been so many times before.

This promising petrol partnership could help bring Turkey closer to the E.U., where member countries are eager to diversify their energy sources. And it could help shore up the poor yet energy-rich countries of Central Asia and the Caucuses, by linking them to Western markets and Western models of governance.

Turkey and its regional partners have made great progress on these fronts already, with a spaghetti bowl of existing pipelines crisscrossing the country -- and still more on the way.

Earlier this year, Turkey and Bulgaria agreed to construct a new natural gas pipeline, which will increase the flow of oil from Azerbaijan Shah Deniz fields to Europe.

Ankara's recent *rapprochement* with the Kurds has improved the prospects of tapping into Northern Iraq's vast stores of natural gas. But, as always,

challenges remain. Turkey's own insatiable energy demand is both a source of leverage and vulnerability. It certainly makes the country a valued customer.

But as domestic demands explode, policymakers in Ankara will find themselves forced to choose between short-term needs, such as price discounts, and long-term strategy.

I confess I'm not an energy expert, but I do know a bit about regional politics, and it's important to consider how the two mix.

With over 50 percent of its gas coming from Russia, for instance, Turkey may feel pressure, should tensions with Russia increase further. Gas supplies from the Caspian Basin may be dependent on demarcation agreements among the coastal states, and Russia has recently suggested delays in those talks.

Turkmenistan is likely to wait before it decides whether to commit substantial reserves to a Western pipeline, at least until infrastructure is in place.

Iran, as a supplier, poses questions of reliability until Tehran reaches an agreement with the international community on its nuclear program.

And Iraq's internal tensions can disrupt agreements to export oil and gas.

The huge gas fields of the Eastern Mediterranean will largely be developed by and transported through Cyprus and Israel. And, needless to say, Turkey's relationships with both countries have been particularly difficult -- although recently, there seem to have been some positive developments.

So, this quick recital of challenges highlights how much diplomatic work will need to be done for Turkey to meet its energy potential. In some instances, the diplomatic efforts will be led by others, like the P5+1 on Iran or, bilaterally, by the U.S. and Russia. It would be in all our interests to see Turkey move forward, for example, in implementing the E.U.'s energy framework, as set forth in the *acquis communautaire*.

But in whatever venue the diplomacy takes place, we should remember

our shared interests. The U.S., the European Union, Turkey, and others have a strong interest in seeing energy from all these sources reach Turkey, Europe, and global markets. Hopefully, as more and more pipelines conduct oil and gas through Turkey's borders and beyond, we can ensure that partnership and trust will flow along with them.

Of course, there's another kind of energy that also must be tapped -- and that is the power of democracy. I've been following and talking about Turkey's democracy for a long time. In 1997, at a time of turmoil in Turkish politics, I spoke for the United States government in saying -- and I quote -- "Whatever issues are going on in Turkey, whatever discussions, and whatever changes people are thinking about, they have to be within a democratic context, and with no extraconstitutional approach."

I remain very proud of that statement, when the U.S. government clearly stood with Turkey's democracy. At the time, it was clear that we were trying to stop a coup, an extraconstitutional approach, to be sure, to resolving political disputes. I hope that my Turkish friends will allow me a few more words on the subject, especially about what it means to work -- and I quote -- "within a democratic context."

In 1997, we have seen Turkey's democratic context make huge strides. Turkey has elected a stable, effective government three times. Millions have participated in these elections. Civilian control of the military has come a long way. Kurdish questions have been brought into open, public debate, and the work continues.

Just over a month ago, the Turkish Parliament passed a democratization package. Despite its shortcomings, the package contains elements that take Turkey's democracy further toward the inclusion of more parties in Parliament. The bill will, among other things, legalize campaigning in any language and allow for lowering the threshold for minority political parties to receive funding.

And the democratically elected government has delivered on its campaign promises. Many Turks have seen a number of improvements in their lives

these past 10 years, such as, one, when the AKP came to power, Turkey's GDP was $231 billion; now, thanks in part to the reforms initiated by Prime Minister Ozal and carried through by the Erdogan government, it approaches $800 billion. Exports and foreign direct investment have surged. Inflation rates have plummeted.

Two, Turkey has stepped up its presence in the family of nations -- for example, as a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council from 2009 to 2012, and as host of the G20 Summit next year.

Three, it has added important pieces of infrastructure, including the expansion of the Metro in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and the construction of the third bridge and the third airport in Istanbul.

Four, as the students joining us remotely via live stream know, a more wired-in Turkey allows students and others to fully utilize the power of the internet with their tablets and smartphones.

And five, more Turks are receiving health coverage, and there was a 28-percent increase in persons insured by Turkey's social security institution over the last six years.

But this is not enough. In the words of the great American politician and civil rights activist, John Lewis, "Democracy is a journey." And even here, in the United States, the world's oldest modern democracy, we know that it's a constant work in progress.

While Turkey's citizens should feel proud of what their democracy has done so far, they also need to feel confident that the journey will continue. And this takes reassurance, especially from those in power, that the country's political leaders are committed to staying the course.

We also see that Turkey is debating important questions, such as the relationship between modern technology and cultural traditions, between government and

religion, between national sovereignty and globalization, and between the role of the individual and the state.

The points of view are diverse, and positions can be polarized. A society facing these kinds of arguments needs, as my good friend and the former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, said recently, in a brilliant report on Turkey, "to consolidate a political culture of deliberation, openness, and tolerance."

In short, all leaders must commit themselves to listen to the ideas of others, even those who did not vote for them. This is the essence of a democratic context. It's about more than just elections. A functioning democracy needs an opposition. It needs a citizenry informed by an unfettered flow of information, and it needs checks and balances so that an electoral majority can also protect minority rights.

As many of you know, I am Chair of the National Democratic Institute, and when NDI began, we talked a lot about what the most essential elements of democracy actually are. And we ultimately decided that the critical component was having an opposition.

Now I've been in office and I've been in the opposition, and I can tell you that it's a lot more fun being in office, but you have to have both. There's simply no such thing as a one-party democracy. And opposition allows citizens to have real choices, and only when there is a real choice can the winner truly claim a mandate.

Those in opposition also have a responsibility to create an alternative that is viable and appeals across Turkish society. For citizens to make a real choice, they must be fully informed by robust and public debate, and, in this regard, there are some troubling facts.

According to Reporters Without Borders, the annual index of press freedoms, Turkey dropped to 154th place in the world in 2013. And today, Freedom House declared Turkey unfree in its latest freedom of press report.

Turkey's restrictions on the media include the use of taxes and imprisonment against journalists and media owners. At least some mass media outlets appear to shy from news that would upset the government.

Now I do love penguins as much as the next person, but when real news happens, it must be shown to the public. In today's world, it's not enough for the public to receive mass media. People should also have the means to express themselves, and we see that in today's public gatherings, but in the digital era, self-expression often takes place online.

I understand the government's need to provide security, but restrictions on the channels people use to speak for themselves should be imposed only when strictly necessary. They should be reviewed by an independent judiciary, and they should be narrow, temporary, and rare.

This vigorous virtual debate matters in Turkey today. From where I stand, it's almost impossible to verify what is said about conspiracies, whether domestic or international. For myself, I'm deeply troubled by unsupported assertions accusing Americans and religious minorities of being behind plots.

For voters, informed voting is possibly only when such allegations have been discussed, investigated, and debated publicly by people from many viewpoints, with an emphasis on verifiable evidence -- and, ultimately, again, checks and balances. In this case, an independent judiciary is essential to a healthy, durable, democracy.

I mentioned earlier my work with the National Democratic Institute. We have had an active partnership in Turkey with the Istanbul Policy Center that led to the creation of the Checks and Balances Network in 2011. The Network has since established the concept of checks and balances, including a new Turkish phrase that I can't possibly pronounce -- and which did not previously exist in the country's political lexicon.

It's vital that any measure adopted in Turkey give confidence that the judiciary will be independent, able to resolve disputes competently and quickly, and also to restrain power when needed. In this regard, I sincerely hope that Turkey opens the chapters on human rights and the rule of law in its accession talks with the European Union soon, and that the external review and validation, as I hope, of Turkey's reforms will be important.

We should remember that the audience evaluating this change is not just domestic -- although that is the most important one -- but also international. Turkey's friends, and partners, and investors will want to be reassured that the trend lines are positive, as they decide how to work with Turkey.

As President Obama put it in Ankara in 2009, "Democracies cannot be static. They must move forward." And the U.S. stands ready to encourage Turkey as it further deepens its democracy -- not as a patron, but as a full partner -- because harnessing the energy of all Turkey's people, just like harnessing the energy resources all around the country, is an opportunity that we don't want to miss. And I don't think we will. And the fact that all of us are here today is really proof of that.

Our nations may not always see eye-to-eye. Each, obviously, has its own interests, pressures, and priorities, but we still need each other as allies and partners, now as in our past.

So, with that in mind, let me wrap up with a story that captures my confidence in our shared future.

A few months ago, I visited Istanbul for a meeting. And one evening, there was a dinner. And I'd gotten all dressed up, and I was wearing high heels. So, there I was, on the shores of the Bosporus, waiting for the boat to pick me up -- only this wasn't your typical dock. There was about a six-foot drop between the landing and the boat. And, to me, five feet tall -- and that's in my heels -- it might as well have been the

Grand Canyon. It was raining and slippery, and I was very anxious about how I'd navigate the treacherous descent.

So, then the captain was kind enough to turn around the boat so that I could step on the prow, which was a bit higher. And he reached out his hand and helped me onboard -- a supportive Turk anchoring an appreciative American.

But then we had to inch along the side of the boat to get into the inside cabin, and, as many of you know, it just got narrower and narrower, and I couldn't figure out where to put my high-heeled feet. And I kept thinking, "Okay, you're going to end up in your beloved Bosporus. It all ends here."

The waters were rough. My footing felt unsure, but I made it. And we made it, and we always do. And I know we always will. Our nations are in this boat together, and we're guided by the same North Star.

And now I look forward very much to our discussions. Thank you very much.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you, Madame Secretary. This is a treat, listening to you.

I'd like to use the occasion to welcome the audience here, but also to say hi to friends, students, and colleagues over in Istanbul.

I think I need not say that this is really a special occasion for all of us, but especially me, as well, as I was a professor of diplomatic history at Boğaziçi University, the old Robert College along your beloved Bosporus -- now two. And those were the years when you served as the Ambassador to the United Nations and then, subsequently, as the Secretary of State.

And with our students, we did follow you very close, and appreciated your efforts to contribute to bringing peace in Bosnia, in Iraq, in Palestine -- all these thorny issues around Turkey.

But I do also have a very personal reason to celebrate this occasion. And my late mom and dad were courting each other in Chexbres, Switzerland -- just about the same time as you were going to school there. And maybe if it wasn't for Chexbres, I may have not been here.

I realize that this is an event, an occasion for the audience, as well as the students, to raise questions with you. But before I turn over to my colleague, Emre Hatipoğlu, in Istanbul, I'd like to permit myself and raise a question. I realize it's a bit of a difficult one. And in the benefit of time, I will let you address it maybe in between the other questions that might come.

In your book, in *Madame Secretary*, you refer to a quote from a book of your father's, where he quotes Tomáš Masaryk, the grand Czech intellectual politician, as well as a President, if not one of the founders of Czechoslovakia -- where he says that one must defend one's self against evil, and confront it. You also say that this quote became very much your reference point, as you worked in your career.

Now I have a rather difficult question here. What is so fundamentally different today from the 1990s? How come, in the 1990s, the United States, the international community, was able to confront the evil that was being inflicted to the Kurds in 1991, and led to the way to Operation Provide Comfort, and arranged for their return to Northern Iraq, and then you efforts in Bosnia in 1994 and '95, with, eventually, the Dayton Peace Accord -- and then, finally, in 1999, the evil that was being inflicted on Kosovo was confronted?

Why not in Syria? The Syrian people are facing an evil there. Why is it that the international community is failing to replicate what they so courageously did in the 1990s?

Now I'm going to turn to --

MS. ALBRIGHT: I could always talk about Chexbres.

MR. KIRIŞCI: So, let me turn to Emre Hatipoğlu, and invite him to say a few words, and then maybe start to take the first round of threequestions. The way we're going to go about this is that my colleague, Emre, will take three questions from the Sabancı audience, and then turn the floor back to us. This is the way in which we're going to proceed -- and, hopefully, take as many questions as possible.

Emre, it's your turn.

MR. HATIPOĞLU: Madame Secretary, dear friends, dear colleagues, a very warm welcome on a very breezy and sunny day at one of the most beautiful hills looking over the Bosporus. It's a great pleasure having you.

And on one personal note, as another person who studied at Boğaziçi University, then had the pleasure of getting a diploma from Sabancı University, I have followed Madame Secretary's work and her achievements with great pleasure, and also Kemal's books and articles have also been a source of inspiration for me. So, on a personal note, this is very, very exciting to be here.

I just would like to make just a couple of miniscule remarks on what Madame Secretary has said, and then I'll turn the floor for questions.

I want to start with an interesting anecdote. I did my dissertation on U.S. Congress and American foreign policy. And back in the time when I was reading -- actually, it wasn't that long ago -- but when I was reading Madame Albright's memoirs, it was an interesting story.

So, it's March 1978. She's been just invited to work in the White House. And there, by the way, she says that although she had a very small office, it was location, location, and location that mattered, rather than -- so she preferred to have a small office in the West Wing, rather than having a big office in the halls of foreign service. So, that's just a small quote.

But on the last Friday of her work -- she was working for Senator Muskie,

a Senator from Maine. On her last Friday, she wrote a note to the White House, saying that, while the Senator was very happy with an international agreement on the seas, she hoped that President Carter would take notice of some of the main fishermen's concerns.

And the next Monday, she started her work in the West Wing, in the White House, and guess what happened? She found a letter on her desk, to be addressed. She was the liaison between the National Security Council and Congress.

So, domestic politics and foreign policy's a very interesting issue. And as Madame Albright was raising these issues with respect to Turkey's democratization, that leads to an interesting dilemma for U.S. as a future leader: how to deal with rising global powers. Whose foreign policies are being popularized over time?

I think we, as scholars -- and you, dear students, as future leaders of this world -- have to think about that. And I think we have a lot to learn from Madame Albright in that respect.

We have a Turkey that's increasingly asserting its preferences. And Turkey's only one case out of a big team of countries -- Brazil, Thailand, you name it. And it makes it very hard for diplomats to negotiate.

And, again, as I said, it makes it even a more challenging environment for United States to lead such divergent preferences, where everybody wants to contribute to grow prosperity and world peace. And how do you go about that? It's a challenge.

Now we have short-term challenges. Any brief glance at any aily newspaper will give you a list of what are the current problems. But there are longer-term problems maybe we might want to think about, too, and how we can address with this new global structure.

Perhaps you read about some of the rise in epidemics. We've seen a lot of Ebola cases in Conakry, the capital of Guinea. For those interested in Latin America,

we've seen Brazil's Northern Opening being increasingly asserted by the Brazilian government. So, it means an increasing Brazilian presence in the Caribbean, eventually. How to address that issue?

The Arctic is melting, and now some experts say that the shipyard from Shanghai to Rotterdam will cut by half when the seas rise. If that is the case, how will we deal with that? The President of Iceland, in one of the meetings, told us that the number of Chinese delegations that he received exceeded the number of delegations from Spain, Italy, U.S., U.K., France, and the U.S. combined.

So, these are some of the longer-term challenges that we might really have to consider, given this emphasis that Madame Albright did on democracy, especially -- and for Turkey, specifically, energy.

In these challenging times, I think partnership between Turkey and United States is very, very, very important, and I think we need some creative thought, which Madeleine Albright has always shown us -- and always solved very, very difficult issues in the world. And I think she's a source of inspiration for us. I think creative thinking can take us a long way in these kinds of challenges.

So, with that, I'd like to turn the floor for questions Kaan Özgüney is a sophomore in our International Studies Program. He also happens to be the President of the International Relations and Diplomacy Club. He was one of the founders -- and, as far as I know, Madame Albright, also one of her founders of International Relations Club, I've heard, at her high school in Denver, if I remember correctly.

So, there you go.

MR. ÖZGÜNEY: Your Excellency, recent events in Ukraine, as well as the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, has shown us that Russia has been, again, asserting itself in its immediate surroundings.

Interestingly, Turkey has been in proximity to with both of these conflicts.

What do you see Turkey's role in Russia's tensions with the West? And, if I may add, do you think that Turkey could have played a more constructive role in these conflicts if it was a full member of the European Union?

MR. HATIPOĞLU: Okay, thank you -- shall we get a round of three questions, or shall we answer them one by one?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yeah, please -- three rounds, two more questions.

MR. HATIPOĞLU: So, AYlin is a master's student. Before coming to Sabancı, she finished her master's at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna.

SPEAKER: Firstly, thank you very much for your very stimulating talk, Madame Secretary -- and thank you to Sabancı and Brookings, especially, for giving us the opportunity to be curious.

In your book, *Memo to the President*, you were strongly highlighting the importance for the United States to take moral leadership in the global system.

It's now been six years since President Obama took office. To what extent do you think that the U.S. has been able to take back this moral high ground?

MR. HATIPOĞLU: Okay, that was a challenging one. Good. And is there a third one? I wonder if there are any hands. So, let me see. Who else is there?

Aiza -- so Aiza is another sophomore student from Karachi, and I'm very happy to have her in my class. So, I wonder what her question will be. Yes, Aiza.

SPEAKER: Good morning, Madame Excellency.

So, what I really want to know is that the U.S. is currently negotiating free trade agreements with the Pacific Partners and the E.U. In the case of the successful partnership with its Pacific Partners, but not the E.U., -- how will U.S.-E.U. relationships develop?

Thank you.

MR. HATIPOĞLU: All right. So, I think you're referring to the

Transpacific Partnership versus the TTIP. So there, Kemal, are our first round of questions.

Thank you very much.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you, and thanks for all the questions.

Madame Secretary --

MS. ALBRIGHT: I am a professor, so I'm going to try not to take 50 minutes to answer them.

But to go back -- I have to explain the letter, because it's an example of how domestic and foreign policy go together.

I had written the letter on behalf of Senator Muskie, and the truth is that you put them on an autopen. And I arrived in my office on a Monday, and I saw this letter. And I wrote back, and I say, "I'm really sorry about your fishermen, but you have to take care about your international obligations." And then I signed it Jimmy Carter. So, I had this correspondence with myself.

But it's an example about where you sit is where you stand. And part of it is that it is -- the role of Congress in our system, I think, is very interesting and complicated. But in terms of answering the question, I think domestic and foreign policy have to go together. They always have, and they certainly do more and more. And I think that in a democracy, it is important to hear from the citizens.

Now the other side of that is that the citizens actually have to be informed. And the members of Congress actually have to also be informed -- and not, as in the case of the United States, where some of them are now proud not to have passports.

So, I think that it takes that double way of having domestic and foreign policy very intricately involved. And I, as somebody that had taught foreign affairs in a number of ways -- and I'm a foreign policy person -- I think that what I added to the mix

when I went into the Carter administration -- and also later -- is respect for the interaction of the domestic and foreign policy.

A number of these questions actually do go together, and they fit within the overall framework that you put out in the first place.

What is very interesting is that those of us that were in the Clinton administration had the opportunity to work in a very new kind of setting at the end of the Cold War. The first President Bush was the first post-Cold War President, and he is the one that really laid down the idea of a Europe, whole and free. And what we were -- whether the Bush administration or the Clinton administration -- asked to do was something that had never been done before, which is how you devolve the power of your major adversary without having an actual fight on the field of battle.

I had never liked the statement which said that the United States won the Cold War. They lost the Cold War, and that is not just a semantic difference; it's a sign that the system fell apart. So, we -- actually, Strobe and I, as partners on this -- tried to figure out how to make sure that a new Russia was going to be part of an international economic system and a part of the Europe, whole and free.

Nobody worked on this harder than Strobe, and it was something where we really thought this was an opportunity to help the people of Russia, whom we respect and had great affection for, be a part of the system. And so everything that we did had something to do with that, in terms of bringing them into the G7, of making sure that they were part of various financial institutions, of really -- and the issue is, did we respect them? We spent an awful lot of time respecting them, and trying to help them at the same time.

And so it was a new era. And so one of the issues that really came up was what was happening in Europe that needed to be whole and free but wasn't. The first President Bush had managed to unify Germany, which was really an amazing step.

But when we came into office, the problems were in the Balkans.

And part of it had to do with, how did you deal with a multiethnic country -- Yugoslavia, initially -- and, by the way, life is really peculiar. We talked about Chexbres. As life would have it, my father had been the Czechoslovakian ambassador in Yugoslavia. So, the little girl in the national costume that gives flowers at the airport -- that's what I used to do for a living. And I actually understand Serbo-Croatian -- and so of all the various places in the world that I was going to have to deal with, it was very fortuitous, in a number of different ways.

And it was the hope of the Clinton administration to try to figure out how, with the help of other countries, to make sure that people of one ethnic and religious group didn't decide to kill somebody just because they were of a different ethnic group -- because that was part of what was different about the end of the 20th century.

You asked what some of my own kind of baggage was. I am a child of World War II. And Tomáš Masaryk, whom you quoted, was somebody that was the President of a country that had emerged from an empire -- and a people that were proud of their ethnic background, but also wanted to be part of a Europe, frankly, that was whole and free -- that was, in fact, being subjected to the evil of its day, which was the rise of Nazi Germany.

So, there are many different parallels, but I had decided -- fortunately, worked for a President who felt exactly that way -- that we couldn't allow the kinds of things to go on in what was going on in Bosnia -- and, later, in Kosovo.

And what was interesting was that, at that phase, I think that the international community was in more of a position to do something about it. I give a great deal of credit to President Bush, the first President Bush, of working with President Gorbachev on making the United Nations functional. The fact that the Gulf War took place as a coalition had to do with that relationship -- and of understanding that the

peacekeeping forces could do more. I actually have a whole lecture on this -- which is, in fact, how the peacekeeping mandates evolved into something that became known now as responsibility to protect.

The aspect was -- during World War II, one could say that we did not know what the Germans were doing. We knew everything that was going on in the Balkans, and we now know everything that is going on in Syria or in Sudan. And so there is this whole concept.

And I think the real question is, for all of us, what is the responsibility of the international community to do something in Syria -- and not just the United States?

So, I could spend a lot of time on this, but it does kind of link together. By the way, it is fun to start an International Relations Club and make yourself President of it. I did that a lot.

So, I think the thing that you asked -- and it's a little bit in relation to the questions that the students asked -- why aren't we doing more now? And some of it does go back to domestic politics. Democracies can't just decide that their people will, in fact, give blood and treasure in order to go into some country -- and how it is received.

And I think that the problem now is the following: There was a poll in the papers two days ago, which basically said that the American people do not want to be abroad. And I would blame it on what I call the Karzai effect, which is that the United States, with NATO allies, went into Afghanistan, lost blood and treasure, and now would like to make sure that Afghanistan can become a functioning country. And President Karzai, for his reasons, has actually been not only not grateful, but actually disparaging. And so that has hurt kind of the mood, and it does go to the question about domestic politics. So, I do think that that is part of the issue here.

To go back to the initial Ukraine/Russia question -- I think what we had hoped was that Russia could be a part of the new Europe. What happened is, as I said

in my remarks, President Putin has made up a whole other story. And part of the issue is that the Russian people themselves, in many ways, can't sort out what their identity is.

I, in '91, did a lot of surveys throughout Russia and Ukraine -- throughout Europe -- and I will never forget a man in a focus group in Russia who said, "I'm so embarrassed. We used to be a super power, and now we're Bangladesh with missiles." And so there is this kind of concern about, what is the identity of the Russians?

And President Putin, who is a KGB former official, has made up a whole story. He made up a story that, in fact, we were not helping Russia during the '90s, that he is equating Kosovo with Crimea -- which he needs to take some kind of a course in history -- a real one, not the one that he's made up.

And so what has happened is, that Russia that we had wanted to be part of the system has, all of a sudden, decided to live in a different era. And it makes it very difficult.

And so the question is, what are the domestic politics in this country? What are the domestic politics in the countries that we deal with? And I do think that Turkey can have a huge role in all of this -- one, because of location, location, location, but also in terms of one of the major problems that I mention in my remarks -- is the energy story -- and also just location on the Black Sea, NATO partner, any number of different ways where keeping our values and our people informed in order not to allow some country -- even though big -- making up its own history, occupying by force the peace of another country, and undermining a sovereign country that is trying to work on its own democracy.

Trade, I think, is a very important part of the knitting together. I think that President Obama has made very clear why both TPP and TTIP are important. I think that part of it is because we are globalized, and there are a variety of issues in those agreements that are very different from the kinds that earlier agreements had to deal

with. But they're complicated, because in each of these packages, there are individual national interests of different countries.

And I think that what the United States would like is not actually to give preference to one or another. I have now said this a couple of times. The United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power, and it's very important for us to recognize that as we look at one part of the world, that we don't forget about the other. And in many ways, those trade agreements are symbolic of the necessity of pulling us all together.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Well, thank you, Madame Secretary.

I would like to reflect a little bit on TTIP and TPP. It's a topic close to my heart, and I've been doing some research on it here at Brookings for some time, and it relates to Turkey, as well.

In Turkey, there is some concern of being left out of TTIP. And because of Turkey's customs union with the European Union, it would leave Turkey in a very awkward situation, whereby, for example, American companies would have access to Turkish market. But this would not be possible in the other direction, because of the nature of the customs union.

And TÜSİAD, the Turkish businessman and industrialist association, was here the last two days, and they did get to see the USDR negotiator with the European Union, Dan Maloney, to discuss these issues. And it was by coincidence that the representatives of business Europe were here, too, and I heard through the grapevine that they had a very strong solidarity on this.

So, as we look into the future and into that kind of trustful relationship that you so very well captured with that boat story on the Bosporus, it will be important that we find a way of including Turkey in TTIP -- or finding a way to negotiate and conclude a free-trade agreement between Turkey and the United States.

And in November, we hosted the Minister of Foreign Affairs here. And

just before he came here, he published an article in *Foreign Policy*, where, to my very pleasant surprise, he made references to TTIP becoming a way of anchoring Turkey in the West. And I do hope that, these days, they do recall that statement on the Turkish side, and an effort is made on the Western side, as well.

Now I'd like --

MS. ALBRIGHT: Can I just comment on that?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Please.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Because I think what you've said is very important, in terms of whatever links can be established. And in this report --

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes, you do, actually, yes.

MS. ALBRIGHT: -- that Steve Hadley and I did --

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes.

MS. ALBRIGHT: -- we talked about having a free-trade agreement --

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes, yes.

MS. ALBRIGHT: -- also, maybe a new BIT --

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yeah.

MS. ALBRIGHT: -- a bilateral investment treaty --

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yeah.

MS. ALBRIGHT: -- and trying to figure out how to enlarge that.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Very good.

MS. ALBRIGHT: There also are some discussions about whether if there is a bilateral agreement, generally, whether it can then just be kind of linked in with TTP in a way that works.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes.

MS. ALBRIGHT: And I am somebody that is always looking for various -- public/private partnerships, a number of different ways where linkages can be

established. So, I think it's a very good point.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes, and in our report on TTIP, we did make references to your idea of an American/Turkish free-trade agreement.

Now I'd like to turn to the floor and pick up a few questions -- one in the front here, and then -- yeah, we'll go -- Tolga and then right there.

MR. TANIŞ: Thank you, Madame Secretary, for your great presentation.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Tolga Tanış from Hurriyet, the Turkish daily

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MR. TANIŞ: I had a hypothetical question, actually. You reminded us of your quote from the 1997 regarding the coup attempt at that time in Turkey, and you said that you are proud of that quote now, when you look back.

Would you use the same quote today if you were the Secretary of State? Given the concerns that you raised in your speech, would you say the same thing today if you were the Secretary of State?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks. Yes, please -- if you could briefly --

SPEAKER: I'm the chairman of the Turkish Society of America. Madame Secretary, would you tell us about the Prime Minister of Turkey -- al Tayyip -- controlled the highest court, and isjailing the newspaper people? Students are against these fascist ideas. As you know, more newspaper people are in jail, compared to China and Iran in total.

Thank you.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you. Yes, one in the back, and then we'll turn to Madame Secretary. Yes -- and then I'll come to you.

MR. MISZTAL: Blaise Misztal, with the Bipartisan Policy Center.

Madame Secretary, thank you for your remarks. Thank you to Brookings and Sabancı for allowing us to come together and talk about this important issue.

As a way to perhaps follow up and frame the previous questions, Madame Secretary, you referred to the connection between domestic and foreign policy in the U.S. context. I wanted to ask you about that in the context of Turkey, and how that should affect U.S. policy towards Turkey.

It's my perspective -- and perhaps you might see it differently -- that the past several years of U.S.-Turkey policy have really amounted to waiting with baited breath that Turkey might play the constructive role that you've outlined, whether it's in Syria, whether it's in Iran, whether it's in dealing with Iraq, with very little to show for it.

And I feel like we're in that same situation today, where we have a Turkish government that makes promising remarks about normalizing relations with Israel, perhaps fixing the situation in Cyprus. We hear good, positive comments about the Armenian situation. But we have little to show for it, and, at the same time, we see a deteriorating domestic situation. Just today, we see what's happening as Turks try to approach Taksim Square for May 1 celebrations.

So, how should the U.S. balance needing to work with Turkey on foreign policy, but also concerns about its domestic policy?

Thank you.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks -- three democracy-related questions.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I want to go back and put this in the context of the remarks that I made, which I think indicated that I personally was troubled by some aspects of what is going in Turkey -- specifically on the press. And, you know, it's interesting -- in my academic life, I have written about the role of the press in political change. I wrote about the role of the press in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and I wrote about the Polish Solidarity press.

One of the basic aspects of a democratic society is to be able to have a free press. And I think that, clearly, that is not what is going on in Turkey, and it is

troubling, in terms of what it is -- how the people can participate.

And I hope very much that statements that are made by Americans and whomever on the subject, really, are heard by the government in Ankara, because it is troubling.

I do think that one of the aspects -- would I make the statement again? I would, but I would have a lot of private discussions on the side, which are very much to the point -- points that I made in my remarks.

What I find interesting is, I do think that there are an awful lot of channels of communication between the United States and Turkey, both in the public and private sector -- that it is interesting how many various exchanges there are.

And I have learned that, as a diplomat, there are times that you make very public statements, both praising and critical, to try to figure out how they really impact the system.

But I have great hopes for Turkey, I really do. And what I find interesting is that there are going to be a series of elections in Turkey, the presidential one in August, and then next year, on the Parliament. There are going to be discussions, and what I would hope is that the atmosphere in terms of information would be so capable of really informing the citizens.

What I do find interesting is, I have followed, obviously, Turkish politics a long time. And I'm going to repeat some of the things I said.

AKP was initially elected because it actually provided constituency services. It was, at least from my observation, more connected to many people. I do think that the opposition let down the people -- because I'm not a government official anymore, so I can say what I want.

I specifically wanted to spend some time talking about the role of the opposition. It is an essential aspect of a democracy, so that there is that kind of choice.

And so one of the things, through the variety of meetings that I have -- whether it's through the National Democratic Institute or going there -- I'm in Turkey, a lot of times, on business, talking about the importance of that -- that there is a responsibility of the private sector and opposition groups to get their act together.

You know, it's interesting -- I do think that one needs to note the changes that have gone on -- or the potential changes in terms of the relationship with Israel.

And by the way, I'd like to go back on something, remembering the lifting of the Turkish embargo. That was in 1978. The people that were the most helpful in the United States Congress were Jewish-Americans -- Steve Solars and people -- and the support of Israel, in many different ways, for that. It is a natural relationship of being non-Arabs in the middle of the Middle East.

And so I think that some of the advances that have been made in this, in terms of the apology by Prime Minister Netanyahu and discussions about compensation and things, I think one has to see that as something -- which, by the way, the United States was quite helpful in kind of moving the process forward.

I think, also, in terms of -- I would like to feel that the statement that Prime Minister Erdogan made on the Armenian issue was a step forward, something that the United States has advocated a long time, in terms of opening up archives and creating a commission in order to look at what actually happened in 1915.

So, I think that what needs to happen now is to -- the United States and others to keep pushing, in order to see where this direction is going by this government.

But I also -- I've made pretty clear what I think about what is going on. I think that there are serious issues, and I think that those of us that have a similar values system need to keep pushing Turkey to go in the right direction for its own sake, because I think it is a country with such incredible potential, in terms of the capability of its people and what it has to do as a partner in a region that is, I think, filled with problems.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you.

I noted how you said you have great hopes for Turkey, but sometimes I, personally, am beginning to get cold feet, because time is running out, and I'd like to be part of those hopes, and see them, and live them firsthand.

Emre, I'd like to turn the floor very quickly to you. We're fast running out of time -- and if you could take very quick, snappy three questions, and we'll turn back to Madame Secretary.

MR. HATIPOĞLU: Okay, three questions, and we'll turn back to Madame Secretary.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you very much. So, the floor is, again, here. So, -- if I can have a question, please -- another international studies student.

SPEAKER: Thank you, Madame Secretary. Your talk was very insightful and very entertaining, especially your descriptions of the Bosporus.

Now I have a question. I mean, we discussed how democracy has to be forward, and we discussed that Turkey needs democracy.

So, what if it elected to join the E.U. first, and then (inaudible)? Clearly, Turkey is hellbent on joining the E.U., and it has been trying for a lot of time. So, if we let it join the E.U. first, can it be so that true international cooperation with partners, with further encouragement from international borders, we actually do fulfill that dream of Turkey becoming a perfect democracy?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Okay, thank you very much, I saw another hand over there, but -- yes, Yeva. Yeva's our PhD student of political science from (inaudible).

SPEAKER: Hello. Thank you very much for your talks.

I have a short question. You have just mentioned that, you know, Turkey should go to the right direction. So, Turkey's emerging market has now a very strong government, which is probably increasingly authoritarian. Why should Turkey go to the

direction which you perceive as right, and align with United States and Europe? What should be incentives for Turkey, because it seems recently, Turkey is, like, 10 years since Lithuania joined European Union. Turkey did not move forward. The economy's growing, and why Turkey should pursue this direction and alliance with West world?

MR. HATIPOĞLU: One of the wider-voiced ideas with respect to the accession. We've got one final question -- yes, please. There is one of our students. I cannot see who she is. If you could introduce yourself.

SPEAKER: Hi. My name's Megan. I'm from the United States. I'm a master's student here in Turkish Studies.

Madeleine Albright, you're a very prominent woman in the United States, and you've done a lot to empower women in politics, in diplomacy.

And I just wanted to know -- in Turkey, women have been empowered for a very long time. They've had the right to vote a lot earlier than a lot of other women in the world, but yet there's very little political participation. And I just wanted to know how you plan -- or how Turkey can plan to empower more women, and get more women with a voice?

And, obviously, Ms. Sabancı has a very important voice in Turkey, but how we can extend that to more women in politics.

Thank you.

MR. KIRIŞCI: All right. Before I turn to you, I know there's a burning question from here, too, and I think we'll be out of time by the time we go -- let me take that, too, please. Yes? Yeah, here -- right there -- yeah.

MR. ALIRIZA: Hi. My name is Bahri Aliriza, President of Northern Cyprus Cultural Society. I'm also President of Polytrade International Corp. I'm also an Obama delegate for 2008 and 2012. And I'm also an undeclared candidate for 2015, for Loudoun County Supervisor. And I know you live in Loudoun County, so hopefully I can

count on your support.

My question is going to be on Cyprus. I did have a chance to speak with the current Ambassador of Cyprus at the State Department before he left, and our main subject was, I guess, with the discovery of oil and gas off the Mediterranean and off of Cyprus.

But the main issue is, as you recall and know, about 70 percent of the Turkish Cypriots supported the peace plan known as the U.N.-Annan Peace Plan. And, unfortunately, the Greek Cypriots were against it, but even so, the Greek side of Cyprus got accepted into the European Union. And as of today, there are negotiations going on, and I know the Ambassador there is trying, and the U.S. is trying positive things, but we still have not gotten anything done, as far as coming to a conclusion and getting the Turkish Cypriot side to be recognized.

And my question to you is, if the United States of America can recognize a military regime in Egypt -- and also supply them with military arms to use against its citizens -- why can't it recognize the democratically elected government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus? And as a friend and as a NATO member, what can the United States do to help the Turkish Cypriots to be recognized? And what can the United States want Turkey to do?

Thank you very much.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you -- quite a few questions there; very little time to --

MS. ALBRIGHT: And they do link together in a particular -- I do think that the whole issue about Turkey being in the European Union is something -- as I stated, I was -- or Strobe, as he introduced me, maybe -- I have been for Turkey being a part of the European Union from day one. I believe that it would be good for Turkey, and I believe it would be good for the European Union.

I have given talks about the fact that I have felt often that the European Union kept moving the goalpost, and making it harder. And part of being a member of the European Union -- or the catalyst of potential membership -- is supposed to, in fact, encourage countries, in terms of democratic principles and a variety of them -- free press, all the things that we were talking about -- aside from the fact that it is important both economically and politically.

So, I am glad that the issue has not gone away, and that there are -- what concerned me, frankly, was that, as it was not clear how the accession talks were going, that there was kind of turning away from West and looking East.

I believe that Turkey -- we keep returning to the location part -- but it is an amazing country, in terms of actually being able to play in both parts. And we need more countries that are able to look both East and West. I think some of the remarks already indicate how kind of globalization and a variety of problems need to be dealt with by countries that are able to look in both directions.

And one of the reasons that we have treasured the relationship with Turkey is the capability that it could do that.

I think what I have found interesting -- I've gone through many different phases where the United States thought that Turkey could be a model Muslim democracy. The Turks didn't want to be described that way. Any number of ways that we try to sort out how to speak a similar language -- and I do think that it is worth pursuing these issues.

Why would the Turkish people want to be a democracy? Because -- and this is my basic belief -- I think we're all the same, and people want to be able to make choices about the way they live. And when they find that there are times that they aren't able to do that, they demonstrate. That is a part of being part of a democracy -- or letting your views be known.

They do participate in elections. It would be nice, as I said, if they had more choice in the elections as they go. And I do think we have seen that, basically, there are more and more people that want to see Turkey go in a direction of democracy. And so I think we should encourage that, in a number of different ways.

Cyprus -- I have to say, I am old, and Cyprus has gone on for a very long -- I can tell you from a lot of involvement with the Cyprus issue, it's very hard to get all the stars aligned at the same time. I have yet to see a time that the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots and the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots actually are all in the same place. And I hold out some hope here that, ultimately, in a strange way, that the oil discoveries will, in fact, be able to move the process forward -- as I also understand that Prime Minister Erdogan -- when I was talking about some of the hopeful steps going forward -- there have been discussions on that.

I think that one can't compare how America treats one country versus another. We have our own national interests, and I think that the issue here is to try to get the Turkish and Greek Cypriots to talk to each other.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you, Madame Secretary. Here, too, the point you made about alignment -- it's not just Cyprus when you look at what they call frozen conflicts. Getting the alignment is such a challenge, but I, too, share your view, that somehow, in Cyprus, it feels like the moment is right for making the final breakthrough -- which would really benefit all. It would be one of those rare occasions of win/win/win.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Can I just add something? And looking at the students, I do think that -- and the subjects that kind of came up, I've been just fascinated by where they came from and --

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes.

MS. ALBRIGHT: -- generally -- and the question about the women was one that is obviously very important to me.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Very good one.

MS. ALBRIGHT: I have to say, frankly, I get very confused by Turkish women. I have had many meetings with Turkish women, and I've never quite been able to get it right, because there are the women that are covered, and those that are uncovered, and I was actually asked a question about, what was I for? So, I used a typical American thing. I said it has to be choice. You have to decide. It's up to you.

And both groups came up to me and said, "How could you have said that? We need to do the same -- one or the other."

MR. KIRIŞCI: Black and white.

MS. ALBRIGHT: But I do think that having more women participate in governments is a very good idea. It is part of democracy. Women are more than half the population in any country, and so this is an argument that I make all the time.

And to return to the National Democratic Institute -- we have women's programs that, in fact, help to train women for public participation.

But, truly, as I look at the students, I think that you must be at least 10 years younger than I am if your parents were in Chexbres when -- but, basically, is that I think our generation has screwed things up. We are leaving quite a confrontative world to students that have a different outlook -- who are much more technologically adept, and are able to plug into all the social media that goes on, and all the various aspects, who travel, who speak different languages, who are able to go to school in different places.

And so I do think -- just listening to the questions -- not that your questions weren't good -- but, basically, this kind of interest and understanding of what has to be done internationally -- and a grasp of whether they're talking about the Arctic, or globalization, or trade, or a variety of things. And so, therefore, Güler, whatever -- all the things that you're doing, educationally and everything else -- hats off to you, my friend.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Well done. Maybe before I close it, I wonder -- I'll just turn back to Emre, to see if they might have one last point to make.

Emre, just before we close --

MR. HATIPOĞLU: I think we're mostly set here. So, before we close, I'd like just to thank, once again, Madame Secretary for her excellent comments. And on behalf of my colleagues, I'd also like to thank -- on Sakıp Sabancı's memory -- to the families of the Sabancı family, for giving us the chance to teach these excellent students. It's been a great pleasure for us, for all these years.

So, thank you very much, from Istanbul.

MR. KIRIŞCI: All right. And now it's my turn to thank you for this really exceptional and unique experience for me, personally -- but, I'm sure, for the audience, as well.

And I'd like, also, to thank Güler Sabancı. We almost went to the same class. I think I was one year -- a little bit ahead of her at Ankara College. So, that's also a very special occasion for me to note.

Thank you very much, and thank you.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Thank you.

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